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I. Jurisprudential Justification for Racial Discrimination
Fifty years after raciallybased segregation was outlawed in Brown v. Board of Education, segregation
continues to occur not as a result of legal mandates, but as a result of socioeconomic and racial
composition of neighborhoods in which a school may be contained.[1] Chief Justice Earl Warren,
writing for a unanimous Court, declared “[t]o separate [minorities] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”[2] Even
though the Supreme Court was clear in holding that race cannot be a factor in primary and secondary
school assignments, some school districts continue to defy that ruling.
Supreme Court decisions are historically based on sources of constitutional law; however, when it
comes to justifying the use of racial discrimination, courts must step outside the bounds of
constitutional authority and rely on nonconstitutional sources in order to justify such forbidden
practices. In an attempt to remedy de facto segregation, many school districts across the nation have
implemented plans to maintain a desired racial makeup at the expense of denying entry to an
otherwise qualified student based on skin color alone. Some social scientists and legal scholars argue
that the diversity created by a more racially balanced learning environment benefits those in traditional
minority groups; however, other social scientists and legal scholars argue that regardless of the
motivation, any determination of eligibility to compulsory primary and secondary education based on
race or ethnicity is harmful to all students. Ultimately, such justified racial discrimination is
unconstitutional.
II. Grutter and Gratz: Racial Preferences Justified in Higher Education
It is undisputed that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the Civil Rights Act), racial
discrimination by public entities is unconstitutional. Yet, a line of cases in various courts reveal that
courts continue to grapple with and even justify the use of racial preferences in public education.[3] In
2003, for the first time in 25 years, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of racebased admission
practices in public education in Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz) and Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter).[4]
In Gratz, the University of Michigan employed a point system in the undergraduate admissions review
process that automatically awarded twenty percent of the required points for automatic admission to
any applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.[5] The Supreme Court
reiterated that “all racial classifications” are subject to strict scrutiny: that the classification must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.[6] The Court ultimately held that “the
University’s policy . . . [was] not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity . . .
.”[7] The Court reasoned that under Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, subjective, individualized
consideration is necessary in order to achieve diversity, rather than objective systems of rewarding
points based solely on race.[8]
Published by Western CEDAR, 2007

1

Journal of Educational Controversy, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10

In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School admissions policy, that favored historically
discriminated against minorities, was challenged to determine if enhancing ethnic diversity in higher
education was a compelling government interest triggering narrowly tailored policies to achieve that
interest.[9] The Grutter Court “endorsed the law school’s stated interest in obtaining the benefits of
viewpoint diversity—not racial balance for its own sake.”[10] Tellingly, the Court distinguished time
and again that their decision applied to higher education, but never reached whether or not the same
would hold true in K12 education.[11] Even in his dissent, Justice Scalia warned that the majority was
creating litigation with their holding, but never alluded to the impact on cases of discrimination in K
12 education.[12]
III. PICS and Meredith: Diversity as a Compelling Interest in K12
In the Fall 2006 Term, the Supreme Court will return to the issue of using race as a determinative
factor in public school assignments in compulsory education in the cases of Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS) and Meredith v. Jefferson Co. Board of
Education (Meredith).[13] It is likely the Supreme Court will rely heavily on their recent opinions in
both Grutter and Gratz to justify their decision, no matter how they decide.
A. PICS: Racial Discrimination as a Tiebreaker in School Choice Plans
In PICS, the City of Seattle schools (the District, or District) adopted a plan to assign children to public
primary and secondary schools based on the existing racial makeup of those schools in an effort to
remedy de facto segregation.[14] The subject plan allows prospective ninth graders to select which
Seattle high school they wish to attend.[15] Once a particular school becomes oversubscribed (more
applicants than open spaces), then a system of tiebreakers is used to determine admission into that
school.[16] The first tiebreaker is favors students who already have a sibling attending that school –
they are automatically admitted.[17] The second tiebreaker depends on the racial makeup of the
school that is determined to be oversubscribed.[18] If the student body of the oversubscribed school
differs by more than fifteen percent from the racial makeup of the school district as a whole, then the
applicant will not be admitted, because the school is considered to be racially imbalanced, unless the
admission of the student brings the enrollment closer to the overall racial makeup of the school
district.[19] Quite simply, the District racially discriminates against high school students in assigning
them to schools.
Parents of school children who were not, or might not be, assigned to their choice of schools as a result
of the second tiebreaker brought this case under state and federal law.[20] According to the District,
their plan is compliant with Grutter because it addresses the compelling interests of (1) “educational
and social benefits that flow from racial diversity, and (2) racial balance “avoids the harms resulting
from racially concentrated or isolated schools.”[21] After a complicated procedural history, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court and held “that the District’s interests in obtaining
the educational and social benefits of racial diversity in secondary education and in avoiding racially
concentrated or isolated schools resulting from Seattle’s segregated housing pattern [were] clearly
compelling.”[22] The Ninth Circuit further held that the subject plan was narrowly tailored to achieve
diversity[23] and condoned racial discrimination by the local school board in secondary education.
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B. Meredith: Racial Discrimination to Remedy Prior Racial Discrimination
In Meredith, the Jefferson County schools adopted a plan to assign children to public primary and
secondary schools based on the existing racial makeup of those schools, after being released from a
desegregation order.[24] The students were divided into two categories: black and white (including
Latinos and Asians).[25] According to the school district, the assignment was necessary to ensure that
the black population of all public schools was between fifteen percent and fifty percent of total
enrollment.[26] When a particular school is situated at either edge of the range prescribed, race is the
decisive factor in determining a child’s admittance into that school.[27]
When Crystal Meredith (mother of Joshua McDonald) attempted to transfer her son from one school to
another, the application was denied because doing so would disrupt the racial balance at the preferred
school.[28] Consideration was given neither to Joshua McDonald’s grades or interests nor the available
space at the preferred school, merely the whiteness of Joshua McDonald.[29] Using Grutter as
justification, the district court in Meredith bought into the respondents’ argument that maintaining
integration was a compelling state interest in K12 public education and that the district’s policy was
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.[30]
C. Proper Consideration for PICS and Meredith
The Grutter Court endorsed the law school’s stated interest in bringing viewpoint diversity to the law
school classroom by obtaining the “educational benefits” of “exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”[31] Unlike universities, K12 public schools are not protected as a
special niche in American jurisprudence, and their educational purpose does not hinge on the “robust
exchange of ideas.”[32] The educational purpose of K12 public schools is to teach and inculcate, not
to foster debate between diverse viewpoints.[33] Furthermore, K12 public schools prepare students for
citizenship, which necessarily includes teaching of “equal protection” as enshrined in our Constitution;
however, the continued, pervasive discrimination against a member of any race or ethnicity by local
school boards is contradictory to that end.
Even if “diversity” is accepted as a compelling interest in K12 schools, the methods used in Seattle
and Louisville are not the best way to achieve that diversity. Reinforcing the ideas that (1) race is what
matters most, (2) race will give one an advantage, and (3) that diversifying racial composition is the
sole means of creating diversity in the classroom, all give children a disadvantage in real world
application if the societal goal is to abrogate all racial discrimination.
IV.Improper Use of Social Science in American Jurisprudence
Supreme Court decisions are historically and rightfully based on sources of constitutional law;
however, when it comes to justifying the use of racial discrimination, against any race (including
whites), the Court chooses to step outside the bounds of constitutional authority and rely on
nonconstitutional sources in order to justify such forbidden practices. The use of gender and race as a
factor in implementing voluntary integration plans has triggered a renewed interest in the issue of
racial integration in American public school systems.[34]
Historically, courts have struggled to clarify permissible use of racial factors in considering a
candidate’s qualifications for admissions.[35] In more recent decisions, courts are using social science
literature and studies to justify the use of race and gender in admissions and student assignment
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support for its position in Grutter, the Court cited social science evidence that
“diversity promotes learning outcomes and ‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society.’”[37]
A. Social Science Studies Are Outside the Bounds of Constitutional Authority
In deciding cases, judges are bound by constitutional authority; however, they are permitted to use
persuasive authority at their discretion. Persuasive authority, however, is generally limited to law
review articles, American law reports, treatises, and practice materials. When judges step outside the
recognized bounds of authority in deciding cases, they become the trier of facts rather than the trier of
law.
Social science is a branch of science that deals with the institutions and functioning of human society
and with the interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of society. The judiciary is not
sufficiently capable of deciphering which social science studies are appropriate to use, because it is an
academic area in which they themselves were not formally trained. As members of the judiciary,
trained to analyze legal issues, judges are not social scientists trained to understand the empirical
results of these studies. Social science emphasizes the use of the scientific method, including both
qualitative and quantitative methods. There are many limitations in social science studies that judges
are not trained to understand. Selfselection problems plague all longterm studies, but when this bias
is controlled the results of the study indicate little or no benefit exists from integration.[38]
The Supreme Court has recently reiterated the “elementary” requirement of due process that “the
decision maker's conclusion… must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the
hearing.”[39] Decisions on the basis of the trial court's personal opinions, no matter how well founded,
would deny the litigant this right, as well as the right to crossexamination and to an impartial decision
maker.[40] The judge, of course, cannot be crossexamined, and no judge could be expected fairly to
weigh what is in effect his own testimony against testimony of other witnesses.[41] Judges study
jurisprudence, the science or philosophy of law. Social scientists study the human aspects of the world;
the judiciary studies the legal aspects. Judges should not attempt to analyze social science studies, nor
should social scientists analyze the legal merits of a case.
B. Violation of the Court’s Neutrality
Judges are not experts in education and are not particularly able to identify in detail those curricula best
designed to ensure that a child receives a sound basic education.[42] Yet, in both PICS and Meredith,
the judiciary posited their idea of how a child receives an educational benefit through voluntary
integration programs. Educational benefit thesis underlying the respondents’ case theories in PICS and
Meredith cite to social science studies for support, yet fail to mention any study critical of the evidence
that a benefit exists for racebased factors.[43]
It is not the role of the judiciary to cite to additional social science studies to support their opinion.[44]
A decision by an appellate court is limited only to the evidence presented to it during trial.[45] Nowhere
in the briefs submitted by appellant, respondent, or amici, were the same studies cited by the Ninth
Circuit in their opinion cited to as authority to be considered by the court. Social scientists were used
as experts at the trial court level, as well as social science studies as further evidence for the experts.
Although the court is free to cite to legal authority in their judicial opinions, inclusion of authority
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol2/iss1/10
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pertaining to social science evidence not cited to by counsel violates the neutrality of the court. If the
content of these social science studies were so commonsense in nature, neither party would have
required the use of experts to testify and explain the significance of the studies’ findings.
The Court first hinted at the permissibility of voluntary integration in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg
Board of Education.[46] Even the best example of desegregation in the nation, CharlotteMecklenburg,
showed no net reduction in the racial achievement gap over a fifteen year period.[47] Desegregation
only had a significant impact on achievement when it started at the very beginning of schooling.[48] In
addition, a recent study by Armor suggests no relationship exists between racial concentration and
achievement after controlling for differences in socioeconomic status.[49] These limitations and
findings of insignificant correlations were not discussed by the court in either PICS or Meredith.
The Ninth Circuit in PICS rejected the raceneutral socioeconomic alternative to racial integration.[50]
“Although there was no formal study of the proposal by District staff, Board members’ testimony
revealed two legitimate reasons” for rejecting the socioeconomic alternative: (1) “it is insulting to
minorities and often inaccurate to assume that poverty correlates with minority status;” and (2) students
would be reluctant to reveal their socioeconomic status to their peers.[51] The dissent argued, “such
analysis seems far from the ‘serious, goodfaith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives’
demanded by Grutter.”[52] Judge Bea elaborated, “without formal studies (or indeed any earnest
consideration of the alternatives), there is no way of knowing whether the District actually seriously
considered, and rejected for valid reasons, lessrestrictive raceneutral alternatives.”[53] Such
consideration is necessary in order to satisfy the “narrowly tailored” requirements set forth in Gratz.
[54] Judicial neutrality also requires consideration of alternatives that best exemplify the arguments
being made by both parties.
V. Conclusion
Almost thirty years ago, Justice Powell warned that “[p]referring members of any one group for no
other reason than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.”[55]The racial discrimination
being challenged in the PICS and Meredith cases is clearly unconstitutional. Children are being
assigned to schools, based on race, to achieve a racial balancing scheme: it is discrimination for its
own sake.
Achieving diversity as an educational benefit may be a compelling government interest in higher
education, but not in compulsory education and it should not be so.[56] However, in determining what
constitutes a compelling government interest, courts should not turn to social science research to find
support for their conclusions. Judges are bound the constitutional authority granted to them: to step
outside their bounds is to step outside the role of the judiciary and into the shoes of an advocate. For
reasons discussed herein, the Supreme Court limited the holding in Grutter to higher education only;
therefore its application to compulsory education is wrongful and both PICS and Meredith should be
overturned.
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